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Accounting for psychological problems: How user-
friendly are psychosocial formulations? 
 
Formulation, with its use of psychosocial explanations for psychological problems, 
has the potential to normalise and destigmatise clients’ difficulties.  However, we 
present findings from a recent study which suggest that for mental health service 
users, using psychosocial explanations is not a straightforward process. 
 
Introduction 
In spite of its prominence in clinical psychology, and the extensive literature 
associated with it, formulation is still largely discussed from the perspective of 
researchers and clinicians rather than clients.  As Butler (2006) notes, formulation has 
been seen as an important means by which clinicians can ensure that their practice is 
informed by theory.  By contrast, there has been very little investigation of the impact 
of formulations on clients (Johnstone, 2006) and virtually no discussion of the value 
of such psychological explanations as a resource for clients to draw on in accounting 
for themselves to others.  Yet the need to account for oneself to others may be central 
to service users’ experiences, given that their thoughts and feelings may be seen as 
irrational or even taboo and their behaviour considered unhelpful, unreasonable, a 
sign of weakness or otherwise shameful.  As such, service users often struggle to find 
ways of making sense of their difficulties as reasonable and understandable (Casey & 
Long, 2003; Lewis, 1995) and to convince others of this in a cultural context where 
experiencing psychological problems can be highly stigmatising (Davidson, 2005; 
Herman, 1993).  By offering an account of how the client’s difficulties have arisen in 
a particular context, psychosocial formulations may not only make something 
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apparently chaotic appear more comprehensible and manageable to the client (Butler, 
2006), but also normalise and therefore destigmatise psychological difficulties.  If 
particular thoughts or behaviours make sense as a consequence of the person’s history 
and current set of circumstances then there is perhaps less reason for them to appear 
shameful or to confer a deviant identity.  In support of this suggestion, several recent 
research studies have indicated that where members of the general public focus on 
psychosocial rather than biomedical explanations for mental health difficulties they 
are less likely to view users of mental health services as dangerous, unpredictable or 
different and are less likely to view problems as chronic (see Read et al., 2006 for a 
review).  Although of course some psychological formulations can be shaming by 
emphasising personal deficits (Boyle, 2001; Gilbert, 1998), psychosocial formulations 
have the potential to challenge assumptions which unquestioningly locate 
psychological problems within individuals, marking them out as in some way 
different.  Instead, the possibility is raised that many people, given similar 
circumstances, might experience similar difficulties.  However, data from our recent 
research (Leeming, 2008) have suggested that using psychosocial explanations of 
one’s difficulties to account for oneself to others in a way that produces a positive 
identity is not a straightforward process.  The next section of the paper briefly 
describes the research project and outlines some of our findings in relation to this 
issue. 
 
Background to the study 
We do not aim to give a full account of the study here, but to outline the aims and 
methods and briefly present some of the findings relevant to the present discussion.  
Twenty-two mental health service users ranging in age from 15-89 were interviewed 
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as one part of a larger qualitative research project on managing shame.  As such the 
study was not a direct investigation of receiving and using a specific psychosocial 
formulation but, as will be seen, the data provide potentially valuable information 
about how the kinds of psychosocial explanations contained in many formulations 
might or might not be taken up by service users.  The participants were recruited via a 
child and adolescent mental health service, two community mental health teams for 
older adults and a user group which campaigned around issues of stigma.  The focus 
of the semi-structured interviews was on how the participants managed the potential 
for shame that can arise from using services and from experiencing difficulties which 
are often viewed pejoratively.  This included discussion of the disclosure of 
psychological difficulties to others and of participants’, and others’, understandings of 
the nature and causes of their difficulties.  A thematic analysis of meaning-making 
was then carried out which drew on both contextual constructionist and discursive 
approaches to data analysis, approaching ‘meaning-making’ as the participants’ 
attempts to construct meaning from the events in their lives, interpreted within a 
particular local, cultural and discursive context.  As such the analytic themes were 
developed from (and assumed a link between) the participants’ attempts to account for 
their difficulties to the interviewer and their reports of trying to make sense of their 
difficulties for themselves and others, outside of the interview.  
 
Results  
Several themes were drawn from the analysis.  Here we will discuss the theme of 
‘difficulties in using psychosocial explanations’ and then briefly contrast this with 
another theme – ‘diagnosis as both salvation and damnation’.   
 5
Difficulties in using psychosocial explanations 
All but three of the participants mentioned psychosocial causes for their distress, and 
many of them had developed this understanding through discussions with mental 
health professionals, including psychologists.  They talked about the personal 
relevance of early physical and sexual abuse, persistent bullying, domestic violence, 
war trauma, loss of key attachment figures and otherwise unsatisfactory relationships.  
Although this seemed to enable several of the participants to make some sense of their 
difficulties as reasonable and understandable, they were often much more tentative in 
accounting for their difficulties in this way than they were when using medical 
diagnoses to account for their problems.  For example: 
I was only 4 when my mother died erm…1if it does have any influence on you 
know, leading to depression, I don’t know (Heidi, OP) 
 
Psychosocial explanations were also used far less than medical explanations for 
resisting alternative potentially shameful interpretations of their behaviour – for 
example, that they were weak, deliberately antisocial or malingering.  In fact, where 
adverse circumstances were referred to, several of the participants spoke as if these 
would only be a sufficient justification for their psychological difficulties if they were 
able to demonstrate that the circumstances were extreme.  They often told lengthy 
stories emphasising the severity of the trauma and explaining the impact of the 
experience as if this was necessary to warrant the profound effect of the events.  For 
example Chloe, who connected the onset of her restricted eating and purging with an 
experience of bullying by other teenagers, emphasised the impact of this on her: 
 
                                                 
1
 Notation within quotations is as follows: ‘…’ material omitted; ‘[ ]’ encloses material added for 
clarification; ‘(.)’ brief pause; ‘(..)’ longer  pause; ‘OP’ older participant from older adult services; 
‘YP’ younger participant from child & adolescent services; ‘UG’ participant from user group. 
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I mean I’d been bullied so much before but that night when he rang me up 




Similarly, several participants took pains to emphasise the magnitude of the difficult 
circumstances they faced.  For example Gabrielle, a teenage girl who had struggled 
with the consequences of domestic violence, answered as follows: 
I Do you have any thoughts on why…things got suddenly so bad for you 
in January…? 
G  I don’t really know…everything bad came at once, all in one 
week…and it just, I couldn’t handle it, I don’t know why…and like I 
wouldn’t normally be like that.  Like if something happened I’d brush 
it over my head.  But this time all of it came, I just couldn’t handle it.  
 
 
The participants’ emphasising of the severity and impact of the events can perhaps be 
read in the context of what Yardley (1997) refers to as a discourse of coping.  As she 
argues, the notion of coping may obscure the reality of what is being coped with and 
imply that often we can overcome adversity, whether or not we do so being 
determined by some inner quality that we supposedly possess.   For the participants, 
discussing life events as causes of their difficulties opened up the possibility of their 
being judged negatively with regard to what they ought to be able to cope with: 
 
…lots of people think that losing a leg, getting your neck broken (.) or it 
shouldn’t affect you as a man, you should be stronger than that, (Frank, OP) 
 
...
 it’s that sense of failure, of not being able to cope, of being a lesser person, 
not not a whole person, having bits missing...(Michelle, UG) 
 
Without recourse to mutually agreed criteria for determining that they had in fact 
suffered enough adverse circumstances to warrant severe psychological difficulties, 
the participants could be positioned as weak or incapable for not being able to cope.  
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There were also a number of other ways in which psychosocial explanations seemed 
to cause difficulty.  Some explanations seemed too exposing, for example relating to 
abusive and humiliating events.  One of the older participants, Bob, said that he was 
unable to tell the interviewer about the events which he saw as leading to his 
depression because, as he put it, ‘they’re very personal…and very embarrassing’.  
Therefore, although embarrassed about using psychiatric services, he felt unable to 
account for this in any way other than by using the term ‘depression’ with his friends: 
 
…they know nothing about my personal difficulties.  All they know that I was 
very, very depressed and I’ve never told them why, where or how. 
 
 
Citing psychosocial causes could also mean to the participants that they were blaming 
others.  This was difficult not only because it meant challenging significant 
relationships but also because it seemed to mean to one or two of the participants that 
they were unreasonably shedding responsibility for their problems.  For example 
Victoria, who related her diagnosis of bi-polar disorder to earlier sexual abuse as a 
child, appeared uncomfortable about externalising blame in this way: 
 
I’d got the issue of abuse to deal with…I thought well maybe that caused it…I 
certainly wasn’t forced to work to a resolution and a forgiveness but I did get 
there in the end, but…of course I was blaming the person that perpetuated the 
abuse um for my mental health problems as well.  I mean I understand now 
that it can actually be a trigger but it’s actually a trigger for something that’s 
already there (Victoria, UG). 
 
 
Victoria’s apparent reluctance to blame others and her implicit use of a generic 
vulnerability-stress model could be seen as reflecting a similar reluctance in 
professional discourse to ‘blame’ families for mental health difficulties (Johnstone, 
1999).  Although there is not the space to explore this in detail here we would suggest 
that this also relates partly to a discourse of 'personal responsibility' connected to the 
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modern autonomous western self, which as Smail (1996) suggests, is the idea 
that individuals are necessarily more likely to achieve improved well-being by 
'recognising' that they are 'responsible' for their behaviour.  This therefore makes it 
more difficult for clients to think about how other people are implicated in their 
difficulties.  
 
Diagnosis as both salvation and damnation 
The participants’ tentative use of psychosocial explanations can be contrasted with 
their more confident use of medical diagnoses to account for their difficulties.  Many 
of the participants seemed to feel that psychiatric diagnoses offered a stronger 
justification for and validation of their difficulties and, like Michelle, talked about a 
sense of relief in being given a diagnosis: 
 
I was relieved to get a diagnosis [‘complex post-traumatic stress disorder’] 
because it (..) it made me feel less of a lesser person,…that there’s a reason 
for my difficulties.  Validated – I felt validated, um (.)…I wasn’t on my own…if 
you have trauma when…you’re growing up as a child then it’s inevitable that 
you’re going to have difficulties.  So I didn’t feel so (.) weak if you like… 
 
Adding a disorder to the causal chain in this way suggested there was a risk that life 
events alone would not be seen as sufficient for her difficulties to be considered 
reasonable.  Despite her statement ‘it’s inevitable that you’re going to have 
difficulties’, the validation of the impact of her early experiences by a diagnostic label 
seemed vital.   
 
Through using psychiatric diagnoses the participants were able to resist blame by 
positioning themselves as victims of biological processes and to challenge the notion 
that they were malingering: 
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…what a lot of people don’t know about depression is that it’s as though 
somebody’s borrowed your brain… a little thing like vacuuming is a big 
chore. (Clive, OP) 
 
I was very big on blaming myself for having bi-polar, because I thought I’d 
given it myself by drinking.  I didn’t think of that as being a symptom 
(Victoria, UG) 
 
Several of the participants also expressed a confidence in the ability of diagnostic 
concepts to make sense of the physicality of their difficulties: 
 
Because you don’t only have these depression and anxiety it also causes 
physical pain all over the body.  I used to have bad earaches…headaches, 
sleeplessness, no appetite, you know there’s so much involved in it this mental 
health. (Heidi, OP) 
 
In contrast, psychosocial explanations were not generally used to try and account for 
troubling bodily experiences.  Moreover, a double standard was noticeable throughout 
the data in that the burden of proof when accounting for oneself using diagnostic 
concepts seemed much less than when using purely psychosocial explanations.  The 
participants seemed to feel less need to justify a claim that ‘depression’ or another 
such disorder had caused particular difficulties than they did to justify a claim that 
adverse circumstances had done so.   
 
However, although psychiatric diagnoses seemed in some ways to provide a stronger 
warrant for puzzling behaviour than psychosocial explanations did, many participants 
also experienced their diagnosis as implying something profoundly negative about 
themselves.  They talked of the many negative attributes associated with their various 
diagnoses including dangerousness, aggression, incapability, instability, lack of 
reliability, lack of social skills, deceitfulness, irrationality, vanity, and intellectual 
disability or decline.  The diagnostic categories therefore had many of the same 
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associations for the participants that they have for the general public (e.g. Crisp et al., 
2000; Read & Harré, 2001).  Chloe, who was quite ambivalent about the value of 
diagnosis, said: 
...I like feel bad enough about myself anyway, why do I need to feel bad about 
being anorexic now? (Chloe, YP) 
 
Therefore, although citing a psychiatric diagnosis could be a useful way of accounting 
for one’s changed behaviour, the participants then had to manage what was often an 
even more problematic identity as someone who was ‘mentally ill’.   
 
Conclusions 
As Harper and Moss (2003) note it is important to consider the purpose of 
formulations and other theoretical explanations of clients’ difficulties and to ask for 
whom they are developed.  Although formulation may indeed be of value to clinicians 
in informing practice, we have perhaps previously paid too little attention to the ways 
in which psychological and psychosocial explanations may help or hinder clients in 
accounting for themselves to others and in managing a potentially problematic 
identity.  Indeed we were struck throughout the research by the pressure felt by 
service users to account for their problematic behaviour and emotions to friends, 
family, employers, neighbours etc and by the moral judgements implicit in this 
process. 
 
While further direct research is therefore needed into how clients engage with, use 
and are affected by formulations and other explanations of their difficulties given by 
mental health professionals, our present findings suggest several issues worthy of 
consideration.  First, it may be useful for psychologists to work with clients not just in 
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developing a coherent self narrative but also in looking at how this works as an 
accounting device within their particular social niche. We can actively help clients to 
develop better resources for accounting for their difficulties to others, bearing in mind 
dilemmas such as whether or how to expose shameful past events which could make 
current difficulties understandable or how to give due weight to adverse 
circumstances without feeling that they are unfairly blaming others or inappropriately 
abdicating all personal responsibility.  This process might include using systemic 
ideas to counter the notion that people must blame either their families or deficient 
selves for their difficulties.   
 
Second, although many formulations refer to bodily processes, we have perhaps 
tended to under estimate the importance of the embodied nature of emotional distress.  
Several of our participants used psychiatric diagnoses as if these were the only 
recognised means of conveying to others that their bodies were implicated in their 
difficulties in ways over which they had little control.  Third, the participants talked as 
if psychosocial accounts were likely to be subjected to more critical scrutiny than 
diagnostic explanations partly because of doubts over what constituted sufficient 
adversity to justify current psychological difficulties.    
 
All of these points suggest that we need to be more active in placing more 
sophisticated explanations of psychological problems within the public domain.  
These could focus on, for example, challenging the normal/abnormal and mad/bad 
dichotomies; documenting the range and complex inter-dependence of psychological, 
behavioural and physiological responses to adverse circumstances and emphasising 
both the cumulative effect of stressors and the importance of the presence or absence 
Deleted:  
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of protective factors such as social support in accounting for individual differences in 
response to adversity.  If we do not do this, then service users may face an 
unacceptably heavy burden in trying to explain their problematic behaviour and 
emotions to themselves and others. 
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